PLUS
非採訪.學術作品
Taiwan: A State, A Likely State, or
A Province of China?
The
Morrell Studies Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy
at
the University of York / 7th
September 2002
According to the definition of dictionary, the adjective 'likely' means 'having an appearance of truth or fact' or 'apparently suitable or qualified (for a purpose or an action)'. - Murray, Bradley, Craigie & Onions (ed.), 1989: 949, the Oxford Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon Press .

I would like to thank Daniel Nehring, Yu-Jung Lee as well as my supervisors Robert Falkner and Paul Penning for reading and commenting on the drafts. Jeffrey Caddel read the manuscript in its entirety and provided helpful advice. I own a particular debt of gratitude to Jeffrey Caddel, Daniel Nehring and Carolina Matilde Serna Barquera for their continuing encouragement and support.
Introduction
People might argue that the question whether Taiwan is a state, a likely state, or a province of China is only a subject in regard to Taiwanese or, to a lesser extent, to the relationship between Taiwan and China. Furthermore, it seems to be an old-fashioned issue that is not appropriate for contemporary intellectual discussion since the twenty-first century is an age when globalism takes precedence over separatism, interdependence over independence. Indeed, to consider a political status of an island is not as grave as the wars in Middle East or Africa in the current international politics. Then, it is obviously, in this paper, that I have to convince intellectuals and politicians who might be interested or involved somehow in this topic that the present vague status of Taiwan should be resolved as soon as possible for a peaceful future in the world.
For further discussion and more thorough examination, I put my central question as such: 'can we understand the de facto political status of Taiwan within theories of the state in international relations'. From this core issue, three main arguments will be revealed as follows:
1. From theories, is it possible to have a sate without an international identity?
When I ask this question, it is because not only does Taiwan lack a seat in the United Nations but also unsatisfied of formal, or official, relationships with most states in our global society (note 1) for its complex historical and political background. However, there are more than 30 developed or newly industrial countries which don't have any official relationship with Taiwan yet have traded with this 'Asian economic tiger' in both official and private sections for about 40 years (note 2). Moreover, the relationships of commercial or financial exchanges between Taiwan and these countries usually follow international regulations. From this viewpoint, if Taiwan could be recognized as a state, can any existing theory support this condition? What is it? How does it explain this situation in empirical circumstance? If it is lack of proper theories for this phenomenon, how can we understand it or explain it?
2. When I say Taiwan is a likely state, it means that it seems reasonable for Taiwan to be a state.
The question here is whether there is any theory which can interpret a state like Taiwan that has not been given authority for international identity but possesses an entire governmental system.
To draw attention to this point, I would like to dig deep into the further query: if Taiwan can only be regarded as a likely state, how will theories of state explicate a government formed via democratic processes and by its mandate of citizens?
3. Is there any theory can explain that 'a province Taiwan' belongs to two 'countries'---the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC)?
For many people, such a question is too ridiculous to imagine. However, in the real world, this abnormal position has been claimed by the former ruling party, the KMT, in Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China since 1949. (note 3) In the first place, we have to ask whether the ROC exists in the world as a state or, in quite complicated term, how can we understand the present Republic of China on Taiwan as a state or a province following its unfathomed historical context.
On the one hand, if we accept the answer that Taiwan is a province of the ROC, then how can we realize the virtual history and geographic boundaries drawn by the KMT, but rejected by the PRC and most other states, including the 'supra-state'-- the United Nations, in the global system? Additionally, if Taiwan is merely a province of the ROC, how can the government of ROC only control this province but not extend its authority to the other 'territories' outside of the geographical boundary of Taiwan? On the other hand, if Taiwan is a province of PRC, what will it be in 'reality' as a 'province' which has never been administrated by the PRC? What about its democratic governmental unity? It has been threatened with military intervention should Taiwan announces that it is not a province or a part of China by the CCP's administration for more than half a century?
Accordingly, I will discuss the above questions that uncover Taiwan's de facto political status in the international system as a unique model which is not only a matter concerning Taiwanese but also a theme relevant to global security and of international human rights if the freedom and independence of the will of Taiwanese is interfered by any militarism.
(note 1) There are only 27 states, comparing with 198 states on earth, have official political relationships with Taiwan. See Ministry of Foreign affairs, R.O.C. [https://www.mofa.gov.tw/newmofa/index.htm]
(note 2) Taiwan's trade distribution includes countries from Asia, America, Europe, Pacific and Africa since 1970s until now. See Ministry of Economic affairs, R.O.C. [https://www.moea.gov.tw]
(note 3) See Peng & Ng , 1995: 71-80
De facto state :
a brief history of Taiwan
As Wachman puts it: 'Taiwan's most intractable problems are political and stem from differing views of the island's national identity. The roots of these matters lie deep in Taiwan's past.'(1994:12) Most of the 'intractable problems' are caused by historical illusions created by the governments of the ROC and PRC.
Though history is supposed to reveal truth, both in the ROC under the KMT administration and in the PRC under the CCP, false historical accounts have been developed within political and educational system of both countries as well as in the media to cheat citizens and have been misleading people worldwide since 1945, after the Cairo and Potsdam Conferences (note 1). For the KMT and the CCP and their respective governments, Taiwan's history can only be drawn with particular or fictitious Chinese stories. For example, KMT insists that Republic of China possesses the territories including Mainland China, Mongolia (note 2) and Taiwan area because ROC 'inherited' the 'inherent territory' via its Chinese ancestors from the emperors of the Qing, Ming and Yuan Dynasties, though Taiwan didn't really belong to any of them. More or less the same, the CCP has taken the same line asserting that PRC's sovereignty embraces Taiwan because that it considers itself as the only de jure delegate of China and has neglected the same problem that Taiwan was never a part of the three aforementioned dynasties. (Peng & Ng. 1995: 38-44)
Likewise, a 'single nation, single state' argument not only puts races (note 3) other than Han people (note 4) aside, but also treats former Han migrants as an inferior sub-group. Devoted to this principle, they emphasize so-called 'collective national benefits' but ignore the dignity and tendency of state's definition (note 5). Actually, they seem to be so convinced of themselves of the differing fictitious historical accounts that thousands of reliable records written by Taiwanese and international intellectuals and writers are discounted out of hand (note 6). Thus, its history before sixteenth century usually 'disappears' as little evidence connects to Chinese migrants and the facts that Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties had never really occupied the entire island.
In contrast to the official illusions, in their account (note 7), which is the culmination of a major research effort in official and deliberate unofficial reference materials (note 8) as well as in analysis of the relationship between Taiwan's history and international laws, Peng and Ng introduced a much more convincing story of Taiwan's legal status with regard to history. The interpretation relevant to the International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 has been proved by Millennium Report of the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan at Millennium Summit on 6-8 September 2000. (Peng & Ng, 1995; United Nations General Assembly, 2001) Accordingly, all people have the rights of self-determination and, base on the rights, are able to 'live in peace and dignity' along with free from 'the scourge of war through respect for international law' (United Nations General Assembly, 2001) In this fashion, even though its history has been linked to Austronesia and Southern China in Prehistory, Han people from China in around A.D. 500, Dutch in 1624-1661, Spanish in 1626-1642, Cheng Cheng-Kung, a loyalist of the pass Ming Dynasty, in 1661-1683, Qing in 1683-1895 and Japan in 1895-1945, (Government Information Office, Taiwan, 2001; Kemenade, 1998; Peng & Ng, 1995; Rubinstein, 1994) there is no law nor evidence which supports Taiwan as being an 'inherent land' belonging to China nor any other country, even in the name of international laws concerning 'terra nullius' and 'occupation'. (1995: 2-12)
Taiwan's modernization from 1990s onward, or more expansively, during the period of the 'economic miracle' beginning in 1960s until the present, has been widely considered as the most important advantage for an interpretation to rethink Taiwan's political status in the world, a state, a likely state or a part of China. However, in addition to interaction between economic transformation and political democratization, historical facts make explicit, similar to the historical background of Singapore (note 9), that Taiwan has never been an 'inherent land' of China if we de-emphasize the unusual point of 'Greater China' or 'Great Chinese history' within which people who dare to disagree with this untouchable precept or its governmental representatives during the authoritarian periods might prepare for making sacrifice. Several incidences occurred in both of the periods of Chiang Kai-She's administration and the early phase of Chiang Ching-Kuo (note 10). One of the most noteworthy incidences is the tragic uprising in which thousands people were killed on 28th February 1947. (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991; Lee, 1998) After this uprising, many Taiwanese intellectuals who had learned how a modern state after World War Ⅱ should response to its citizens and avoid any chance of the use of force to settle civil conflicts, realized that it was not easy to negotiate with a military government like Chiang's administration. The gap existed between the government and the citizens during that time not because of different races, cultures, classes nor they were people from another country, but because of the lack of value in civil rights and political liberality. (Lee, 1998) It was a hard time for Taiwanese citizens to reconcil the gap of differing values right up until the later period of Chiang Ching Kou's administration, when the creation of new political parties were allowed in 1986 and martial law was lifted in 1987. (Government Information Office, Taiwan, 2001 & 2002; Kemenade, 1998; Lumley, 1976; Peng & Ng, 1995; Rubinstein, 1994)
The outstanding economic development since 1960s aside, the KMT's political handling of domestic and foreign affairs have been limited by its tyrannical policies during the period of 1950s-1980s (note 11). Military threat and foreign interference from Communist PRC caused by the historical 'one China' or 'one China two systems' complexities virtually intertwined territories (note 12), were the other strikingly destructive power to bind Taiwan's foreign policy in global society.
Notable political changes began in 1996 when the first democratic presidential election was held. In 2000, the first-ever transition of the presidency to non-KMT party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), smoothly initiated a new era in Taiwan. What followed was an entire change of the ruling party from KMT to DPP in Legislative Yuan by 2001. Moreover, 'with the continued advancement of democracy and economic liberalization', the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference formally approved Taiwan's accession in November 2001. (Government Information Office, Taiwan, 2002) Though the shadow of China's military threats have not dissolved, the publics at large have gradually considered Taiwan's national identity and the official position in the international system more than they did before the commencement of democratic national elections.
(note 1) Kerr, George H. illumined an insightful prospect about how Formosa was 'betrayed' in Cairo Conference. See Kerr, 1965.
(note 2) Mongolia, formerly known as Outer Mongolia, differs its own history from China though it 'remained part of the Chinese empire until the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911' when Republic of China was conducted. While Inner Mongolia is now autonomous region of China, the country Mongolia is a member of the United Nations. See Alexander, Isaacs, Law & Martin, 2000: 420.
(note 3) There are more than 10 minority races of native inhabitants different from Han people have been lived in Taiwan since prehistory. See Government Information Office, Taiwan, 2001 & 2002; Kemenade, 1998; Peng & Ng, 1995. Han People generally indicate people from mainland China.
(note 4) Han people in Taiwan mainly include Minnan (Hokkien) and Hakka. See Government Information Office, Taiwan, 2001.
(note 5) The theories of state will be discussed in the following section.
(note 6) There are also many just resources from other countries, including China. Many of them have taken original resources from Taiwan into consideration.
(note 7) This work was initially published in 1976.
(note 8) Peng and Ng. 1995: 259-272
(note 9) The island of Singapore was controlled by Japanese forces since 1941 until the end of World War Ⅱ and became a separate colony in 1946. After the periods of self-government, part of the Federation of Malaysia, it has governed by Lee Kuan Yew's administration, with People's Action Party, since 1965. Lee Kun Yew resigned in 1990 and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Goh Chok Tung. Chinese is the biggest ethnic group in Singapore, about 77% in its population. See Alexander, Isaacs, Law & Martin, 2000: 576.
(note 10) Chiang Kai-Shek was succeeded by his son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, in 1975.
(note 11) Since Beijing's admission to the United Nations, Taiwan had appeared 'singularly abandoned and isolated'. See Lumley, 1976: 18.
(note 12) As the statement set by Kemenade: 'Beijing considers China to be the Communist People's Republic and contends that Taiwan must be brought back to the fold-by peaceful or, if necessary, by military means. For old-style Nationalists in Taiwan, China meant the Nationalists Republic, temporarily based in Taiwan, which would sooner or later be resorted to its rightful place on the Mainland.' Because of the belief in eventual re-takeover of China, Chiang insisted that it would be 70% political and 30% through military interference. See Kemenade, 1998: 104 & Lumley, 1976: 9.
Is Taiwan a
state?
What is a state? Though there are various theories and definitions with respect to the answer of this simple but basic question, a common and traditional conclusion might compose at least three elements: a set of institutions, a society, national laws or constitution. Sadly, in the history of human beings, so-called 'the leading spirits of whole creatures', before World War Ⅱ, the means of violence and coercion to conduct a state were regarded as legitimate procedures and even owned by 'a great deal of agreement among social scientists'. By contrast, a stream towards 'the creation of a common political culture shared by all citizens', gradually accepted by states with a reputation for democracy and freedom (note 1) after the bloody World Wars, was usually raised by states' elites but read as too naïve to follow so that it was easily left aside when they determined to control people inside the territories. (Hall & Ikenberry, 1989:1-3)
According to the above definition, it is obvious, if apart from 'the means of violence and coercion' (note 2), that Taiwan could be realized as a state after 1949, in which it has had a set of institutions from a central government formed by presidential-legislative democracy to local governments, a society where the institutions are 'at the center of a geographically-bounded territory' (note 3), defined as 35,961 sq. km. (Government Information Office, Taiwan, 2001 & 2002) In addition, as Hall & Ikenberry mentioned, 'not all societies in history have been controlled by a state' (note 4), we can understand that the assertion, Taiwan as so-called 'inherent land' of China, repeated by the KMT and CCP was better defined as 'only in the earliest stages of creating an apparatus of state machinery' (note 5) and should not be concluded as proof to refuse the existing facts. If there is any problem, it is because the falsehoods drawn by the KMT and CCP are treated as a truth, or because the vague condition between Taiwan and China has not been clear-cut. The situation, if an analogy is employed from everyday life, is much like an unhappy couple separated from 1949 but never divorced since the loser or émigré, Chiang's KMT administration, had tried to inquire into the land and the state where it used to control. On the one hand, Mao's CCP authority stayed in mainland China and rebuilt the state as the People's Republic of China instead of the former Republic of China. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-She's KMT authority forced Taiwan, without agreement from its citizens, by agreement deal struck at Cairo Conference to become ROC. He reformed his party and the Republic of China on the island but had not given up his dream for going back mainland China until he died. Using this tangled history, the PRC insists it owns Taiwan because Chiang's administration had never divorced from Mao's CCP. Similarly, KMT has never forgotten that its 'ancestor' Chiang Kai-She owned the dreamland though the mainland has legally belonged to People's Republic of China for more than half a century.
Thus, except the non-government international organization Freedom House, numerous of intellectual textbooks and unofficial customs records in countries which don't have diplomatic relations with Taiwan (note 6), most official international communities have labeled Taiwan as 'Province of China', Taiwan (China) or lack of name on the list of memberships (note 7) even until the present day. Even with an official membership in the WTO as of 1 January 2002, Taiwan has been characterized as a 'customs territory' (note 8), differing from People's Republic of China, Hong Kong and Macao, but is still not labeled as a state. There are also many other different names given to Taiwan representative offices abroad to maintain de facto diplomatic relations with many countries and international organizations (note 9).
What does this mean? A state in different surroundings has an unrecognized or unrecognizable identity? Can theories of state help us to understand this 'richest and most successful pariah in the world' (note 10)? We should not ignore that there is a more serious problem which has to be solved as soon as possible. That is the 23 millions citizens of Taiwan are being threatened with military intervention for simply restoring its history and de facto political condition. What and how will the theories suggest? Alternately, what and how will states who have signed on to supporting fundamental human rights, including People's Republic of China?
Firstly, let us review the western theories: realism is, of course, the most effective of all. However, as liberalists point out, Stalinism and Zazism demonstrated that 'the greatest strengths of this major ideological tradition' can 'terrorize their own citizens.' (1989: 98-99) Then, how can we expect the liberal regimes with 'a good record of not engaging in war with each other'? (1989:99) As Hall & Ikenberry put it, though liberalism is 'good to its friends', 'liberalism is prone to oscillate between spinelessness and naïve brutality in its relations with non-liberal states' and in 'the harshness with which it treats its enemies' since 'nothing in the international politics is gained by refusing to accept the baseline presumption that other states have the right to exit'. Evidence shows as in the instances when the United States has dealt with the former Soviet Union and so-called Third World states, and even in 'the fights against terrorism launched after 11 September 2001' (note 11), it does so only because 'the liberal regimes can suffer from shortsighted popular enthusiasm' which is 'often reactive to political elites styles that 'fail to trust people'. (Hall & Ikenberry, 1989:98-100)
The conflict between different classes was one of the main concerns of Communism (note 12). However, because its founder Karl Marx, overlooked the importance of intellectual and moral leadership of states and societies (note 13), the powerful declaration claimed as 'working men of all countries, unite!' is like a heavy sarcasm to reflect the fact that 'the working classes tremble at Communistic states' (note 14) When we look back upon the history of Communist countries, from former Soviet Union and Eastern European satellites to the present People's Republic of China, North Korea and Cuba, the governments were or are all controlled by a small political elites and most of them were collapsed for 'economic inefficiency, lack of genuine democracy, and denial of basic human freedom.' (Alexander, Isaacs, Law & Martin, 2000: 142) Furthermore, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist countries, as one of the latest exiting Communist Countries, it is an inevitable result for the People's Republic of China to adopt partial pluralist system for its economic development. This includes joining the WTO in which 'governments created the WTO's agreements for a reason: they have to protect their people, their morals, their foods and their environment and still benefit from trade.' (Moore, 2001) Under this tendency, the PRC government will soon face the same historical path as the Soviet Union did. That is a series of peaceful revolutions, 'which removed communist parties from power and opened the way to liberal democracy.' (Alexander, Isaacs, Law & Martin, 2000: 142; Chang, 2002:260)
In addition to the above classical theories, neo-pluralism (or neo-liberalism), new rights and elite theories are some other approaches to 'picture the state in liberal democracy'. (Dunleavy & O'Leary: 2000:348) However, to employ Hall & Ikenberry's words again, 'in the past, state elites were not able to adjust their fortunes to changes in circumstance with sufficient skill to prevent massive wars. It remains to be seen whether they can manage better in the contemporary world.' (1989:100)
Secondly, whenever face the issue of states and human rights, the rhetoric of 'Asian Values' always becomes a wall which cuts off the conversation between some Asian governments, who insist they have different standards of human dignity, and democratic countries or those international non-government organizations with aims to develop freedom, human rights and democracy. What are 'Asian Values'? Are they really so different from the spirit of the basic human dignity, such as fundamental human rights, freedom and democracy? The rhetoric is indicated as values of Confucianism and Buddhism but has been misleading 'by certain Asian leaders' (note 15). In fact, Confucianism is 'a system of philosophical and ethical teachings founded by the most celebrated Chinese philosopher Confucius... in the 6th century BC and by Mencius... in the 4th century BC... The basic concepts are ethical ones: love for one's fellows, filial piety, decorum, virtue, and the ideal of the superior man'. (Alexander, Isaacs, Law & Martin, 2000: 146) In his entire life, Master Confucius never gave up to remind his contemporary kings that they should always respect and love their citizens. Moreover, he also said: 'if the citizens of a kingdom like flowing water and the kingdom as boats, the water not only can carry the boats but also can overthrow them.' (note 16) Is this not the thought of democracy or human dignity? Then, to spread Buddhism, 'this is the noble Eightfold way: namely, right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.' (Buddha, Siddhartha Guatama, in Seldes, 1996: 62) Accordingly, when we look at the record of Freedom House survey, the rather lower percentage of freedom ratio in Asia, including the sustained records of 'not free' of PRC for decades, seems to conflict with the real great thoughts but reflect the misleading of 'Asian Values' of some autarchic leaders in Asian countries. (Karatnychy, 2001:9) In this aspect, the gap of democracy and value between Taiwan and China is obvious (note 17). Even though PRC insists 'one China, two systems', how can two different governments with distinct values and apparatuses unite into one state as well as which one should be a follower, if not only consider the size of territory and the number of population?
To sum up, it seems that none of these theories is able to precisely explain the unique political condition of Taiwan or to solve the unhappy relationship between Taiwan and China. To seek room for Taiwan to move on the international stage, it is worth recalling Pierson's point of view: 'if the state, in both its order and newer forms, is not going away, we need to think much harder about how it might be more effectively directed and controlled by its citizens.' Moreover, 'if the state is here to say (for now), the forms in which we encounter it may certainly be changing. One lesson of the present is that we need to abandon our most exclusive concern with the state as nation-state.' (1996:204)
(note 1) According to Freedom House, 'in 1900, there were no states which could be judged as electoral democracies... monarchies and empires predominated. By 1950, ...there were 22 democracies accounting for 31 percent of the world population and a further 21 states with restricted democratic practices....Electoral democracies now represent 120 of the 192 existing countries and constitute 62.5 percent of the world's population' ( Freedom House (a) 1999)
(note 2) See Hall & Ikenberry, 'states do not always possess complete control over the means of violence, as feudal rulers knew all too well.' Also, in Pen & Ng. 1995: 102-211
(note 3) See Hall & Ikenberry, 1989:2
(note 4) For instance, in the history, Hall & Ikenberry has a brief outline as following: 'Chinese civilization was usually controlled by a single state, but Latin Christendom was never so controlled; modern capitalist society, within whose boundaries most states now live, clearly has laws of development all its own' (1989:2) Additionally, 'kings and power for such a short period that they simply took what they could: as the state was not long-lasting...' (1989:30)
(note 5) Hall & Ikenberry said that ' (in) most states of the contemporary Third World...their citizens often do not belong to a single culture, that is they are not yet nation states, and they are only in the earlier stages of creating an apparatus of state machinery.' Before 1949, Taiwan's political status was much like this statement. 1989:2
(note 6) For instance, on the latest list of UK Visa Requirements, though the Home office of UK does not indicate that Taiwan is a country or territory, Taiwan is classified into the section of Transit without visa (TWOV) but People' Republic of China, including Hong Kong, belongs to that of 'no TWOV', which means no concession and a visa national from PRC 'needs visas even when in direct airside transit.' UK Immigration Service Carriers Liaison Unit, 2002.
(note 7) Taiwan not only lacks of membership with many international official communities, but also is put as 'province of China' in the UN, as Taiwan (China) in the documents of World Bank and included as part of China in IMF. See United Nations, 2002; World Bank, 2002; IMF, 2002.
(note 8) Because of complex political considerations, it so happened that Taiwan jointed WTO around 20 days after China, which was officially accepted at 11 December 2001. On the list of membership, Taiwan is named as 'Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu'.
(note 9) 'Most countries in the Asia-Pacific region have agreed to direct air links with Taiwan. Most accept the practice of "unofficial" ministerial visits, "holiday" diplomacy and annual talks with senior foreign ministry officials from Taiwan.' For these unusual diplomatic relations, the Taiwan office in these countries have various names: such as 'Taipei Economic and Culture Office' (TECO), Taipei Trade Office, and Taipei Representative Office.(Klintworth, 1995:162-163)
(note 10) See Po, 1998, also Government Information Office, Taiwan, 2001 & 2002. The performances are as followings. The economic growth Rate of Taiwan, in the period of 1983-2000, compared with the other countries, such as the US, Japan, European Countries and the other Asian NICs, has raised relatively prompt steps every year by a ratio of 5 to almost 13. Additionally, it is currently the world's 14th largest trading state. In addition, through fair and free national elections, from presidency elections in 1996 and 2000 to legislative election in 2001, Taiwan has succeeded to transform its political structure from single-party autocracy, 1950s-1980s, to multi-parties presidential-legislative democracy.
(note 11) There is a controversy over the policies that American government against terrorism in its internal territory and external enemies after 11 September 2001. Human Rights Watch, 2002
(note 12) As Marx's thoughts were influenced by British industrialization, Germany philosophy, and French revolution experience, Marxism claims to analyze all aspects of classes, economics, society, history, and culture. (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 2000:343)
(note 13) The Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci revealed his vital concept of hegemony, where 'a ruling class is capable of exercising moral and political leadership, thereby achieving the consent of the masses'. In contrast, Marx's original idea argued that 'morality is a constraint which will not be necessary under Communism.' (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 2000:220-221)
(note 14) The original text was 'Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution.' (Marx & Engels, 1967: 120)
(note 15) Western scholars often read 'Asian Values' are those 'may be seen in the assertions ...do not permit human rights...and relying on the general Western ignorance of Asian culture'. However, they will understand what are real 'Asian Values' if they do not only follow the acknowledgement effected by such 'certain leaders' but also learn from original texts and Asian people at large. See Palmier 1996: 149
(note 16) 「水能載舟,亦能覆舟」;The words were written in The Great Learning. Every one who educated in Taiwan's academic system can recite them. Those are also popular phrases in Taiwanese and Chinese societies.
(note 17) Taiwan has been recorded as free and democracy state for more than 6 years.(Freedom House(b), 2001)
Conclusion
The de facto political condition of Taiwan follows the evidence and testament of history. We have to consider from prehistory onwards as it will help us to look at the reality and avoid bias limited by the view of 'Greater China'. Then, we can understand that the relationship between Taiwan and China is neither the same status as that of Hong Kong or Macao and China nor that of South Korea and North Korea (note 1). The history of Taiwan, excepting the emerging era of multi-parties democracy and political freedom, might be more similar to the historical background of Singapore, though the latter has been an independent state recognized by our global society and a member country of the UN for almost 40 years. Furthermore, by reviewing theories of state and so-called Asian Value, including Confucianism, Buddhism and the rhetoric of some specific Asian countries, such as the PRC, Taiwan could be seen as a unique model for further consideration in international relations because of the historical entanglement and the military threat of the PRC.
If there were neither the unfathomed problems with the PRC nor fictitious Chinese history and territory drawn up by Chiang Kai-She's KMT, Taiwan is undoubtedly a state. However, in the name and form of Republic of China, a vague notion of 'China' or 'Chinese' (note 2) along with the odd threat from PRC, Taiwan seems to be a likely state and is even difficult to have an official identity in international arena. Without Taiwan's outstanding economic performance, maybe no one would notice this 'pariah' and its international political position might be another story. In any case, it is definitely the case that Taiwan is not a part of nor a province of China or the PRC.
The question here is: if any one or state is punished or intervened up by force just because one tells the truth in a society or global society, how will all members of the society behave?
If the 'Road Map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration' comes into effect, I would like to repeat the Secretary-General Annan's words in my conclusion: (United Nations General Assembly, 2001)
...making progress in disarmament in all area, including weapons of mass destruction, landmines, and small arms: next steps involve implementing existing conventions, working to develop regional mechanisms to identify, trace and halt illicit traffic in weapons, and supporting civil society advocacy efforts.
and
Fundamental human rights are the foundation of human dignity and must be protected. It outlines the power of democracy to effect change and empower citizens, and reaffirms the need to work collectively for more inclusive political processes, with genuine political participation.
This Declaration was made by the 147 heads of States and Governments, and 189 Member States in total, of course, including People's Republic of China. (United Nations General Assembly, 2001) Accordingly, even the PRC follows its falsehood claiming Taiwan is a 'province' of China it has suggested that the government of PRC and any other members of the United Nations have to 'meet the goals and commitments' of this declaration on 'best Practices' and 'help promote human security', in the implementation instead of idle phrases. (note 3) This is a fundamental issue concerning human rights and the credibility for our offspring if we hope people keep dignity in mind and support each other to avoid any possibility for making war.
(note 1) Taiwan has its own central and local governmental system and democratic process. The condition is different from HK and Macao which were handed over from British and Portugal governments to Chinese government. In addition, unlike Korea was united by South and North, Taiwan's territory was not part of China.
(note 2) For many Taiwanese, 'China' is the notion of nation but not a term for a state. When they claim themselves as Chinese, it might mean that they are Han people whose ancestors were from China. This situation is much different from the condition in Singapore. Citizens of Singapore declare themselves as Singaporean even though their parents were from China. The ambiguous identities between nation (or race) and citizenship are the main problems for the state since, before 1996, most of people in Taiwan were educated to learn Chinese history, but differing from PRC's and the fact understood by our world, such as Mongolia belongs to China. For KMT, the term 'China' either means ROC and PRC or points to Chinese race in general.
(note 3) See 'Executive summary' in United Nations General Assembly, 2001
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World Wide Web
Freedom House
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[https://www.freedomhouse.org/] 7 December 1999
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[https://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/] 6 August 2002
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[https://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/] 30 July 2002
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Conference Program
The Morrell Studies Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy at the University of York
7th September 2002
Plenary Session
11:00 - 12:15
Chair: Professor Susan Mendus
'Ironies of Religious Toleration' - Professor
Susan Mendus (York)
Session 1
12:15 - 13:30
Workshops A
Chair: Sam Clark
'The
Politics Of Identity And The Cyprus Problem In Context' - Athanasia
Papangelopoulou (Essex)
'Taiwan: A State, A Likely State, or A Province of China?' - Chuan-Chih Huang (Essex)
Workshops
B
Chair: Matt Sleat
'Interpreting Misunderstanding in the Relations between India and the USA' - Anna Wishart (Essex)
'The Expressivist Account of Moral Supervenience' - Jorn Sonderholm (St. Andrews)
Session 2
14:15 - 15:30
Workshops C
Chair: Matt Sleat
'Incentives, Reciprocity and Equality' - Fabian Freyenhagen (Sheffield)
'Priests and Slaves: Spinoza contra Toleration' - Jon Rubin (Warwick)
Workshops D
Chair: Alan Thomson
'A role for people's beliefs about value in practical reasoning' - Brian Feltham (UCL)
'Descriptive and Prescriptive Elements in Political Philosophy' - Conor Farrington (Edinburgh)
Session 3
15:30 - 16:45
Workshop E
Chair: Matt Sleat
'Laclau & Mouffe on Inclusion and Exclusion: Towards a Radical Theorization of the Limits of Democracy.' - Lasse A Thomassen (Essex)
'Lyotard's Politics of Writing: Bearing Witness Without 'We'' - Charmaine Coyle (Essex)
Workshop F
Chair: Sam Clark
'Pub Politics: Reflections on an Inclusive Political Community' - Derek Edyvane (York)
'Another Politics: Politics, Modernity and Friendship' - Graham M Smith (Lancaster)
Session 4
17:15 - 18:30
Workshop G
Chair: Sarah Marshall
'The Subject Of Feminist Political Theory: The Meaning Of Women' - Mari Mikkola (Sheffield)
'Power as a Conceptual Tool for Anarchists' - Sam Clarke (York)
Workshop H
Chair: Matt Sleat
'Mystification and the Demands of The Self. Is it True, to Quote Marcuse, that "The Working Class Has Far More To Lose Than It's Chains?''' - Alan Thomson (York)
'Trotsky, Revolutionary Violence and Morality' - Ed Rooksby (York)



